It would be easy for one peace to hide another. Satisfaction at seeing an end to the hostilities in Kosovo should not allow what has just happened in Algeria to pass unnoticed: it is the start of a peace process that may eventually end the country’s civil war.

This war began in the early 1990s with a military coup designed to block the election victory won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). On one side were Islamic forces engaged in guerrilla warfare and terrorism, and periodically embarking on appalling massacres of innocent civilians. On the other were the security forces, reinforced by militias made up of "patriots," which were equally guilty of summary executions, arbitrary arrests and atrocities.

From 1992 to the present day this war has created chaos in Algeria. It has worsened a social situation that was already catastrophic. According to the figures it has resulted in 65,000-100,000 deaths, tens of thousands of wounded, hundreds of thousands of peasants displaced and 3,000 "disappeared" (1). It has also led to thousands of civil servants, artists and intellectuals fleeing Algeria and seeking refuge abroad, depriving the country of people who should have been its lifeblood.

Given such an apocalyptic scenario, why is it now plausible to speak of prospects for peace? First, because the murderous confrontations of the period 1993-96, when thousands of Islamists in the mountain regions were defiantly challenging the government, have ceased. The radical groups have been militarily defeated. Although there are still pockets of last-ditch resistance, they have lost the war and failed to overthrow the regime. Thousands of their militants have been killed, imprisoned, or driven into exile. Second, some Islamists recognise that the military option is a dead end, and now favour peace so that traditional ways of doing politics can be restored, at the price of compromise if necessary.

Finally, at government level, there are divisions within the military who have been the controlling power in Algeria since independence in 1962 (2). Some - the so-called "eradicators" - would prefer the repression to continue until the insurgents are utterly crushed, and would even consider excluding moderate Islamists from formal electoral politics. Others - the proponents of dialogue - not only favour these moderate Islamists being brought into the political process, but also seem ready to accept some form of agreement with the FIS. This might be a way of both restoring legitimacy to the ruling armed forces and creating a national understanding towards a platform of stability in a country that has been traumatised by almost a decade of civil war.

It was the tension between these two factions that led to President Liamine Zeroual stepping down and calling early presidential elections. The outcome (albeit in controversial circumstances, with the six other candidates alleging fraud and pulling out on the eve of the election) was that Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president on 15 April. He has the support of a section of the army (in particular the proponents of dialogue and Military Security, the country’s most powerful institution) and of the National Liberation Front (FLN).

Bouteflika began his career under the wing of Presidents Ahmad Ben Bella and Houari Boumedienne. During the 1960s he was one of the architects of the new Algerian state. A political high-flyer, he had a firm grounding as minister for foreign affairs under President Boumedienne and raised Algeria to the status of Africa’s leading diplomatic power. An able negotiator, whose intelligence is recognised by his opponents, Bouteflika plainly recognises that Algeria’s political system - simultaneously sophisticated and brutal - runs on guile and relations of force.

During his electoral campaigning he declared in favour of "a dialogue with no vetoes" and "national reconciliation." Although roundly criticised by the "eradicator" faction among the military, Bouteflika let it be known that he supported compromise with the Islamists as a way of pulling the country out of the eternal rut of war.

On 29 May 1999, six weeks after his election, the new president spoke to "those who were caught up in the turmoil, but who chose not to take the path of blind violence." He offered those who had been "led astray" a chance to reintegrate into society. As a result Madani Mezrag, head of the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS, announced the "definitive abandonment of the armed struggle." He also expressed regret that an earlier attempt at compromise, negotiated by the army and the military security organisation in 1997, had failed because of the stance taken by Zeroual and his military advisors. He was followed by Abassi Madani, historic leader of the FIS, who assured Bouteflika of his "total and unreserved support for the position taken by Mezrag, to stop the fighting."

The Algerian president is also hoping to bring the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) into the peace process. He is proposing to organise a referendum on national reconciliation, involving an amnesty, except in cases where people have committed blood crimes. In a gesture reminiscent of de Gaulle, Bouteflika has promised to resign if the referendum goes against him.

It would be foolish to imagine that the violence is going to stop immediately, but this time it does seem that a peace process is seriously under way. After some years’ delay, the visionary theses of the Rome Platform (3) seem to have been proved correct. A political compromise is possible and there is a real chance that Algeria - which this month hosts the Organisation of African Unity summit - will find the space to deal with its most pressing economic and social problems. For the Algerian people this may finally offer a way out of the terror.

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(1) See Amnesty International, 1999 report, London, 16 June 1999.

(2) See Lahouari Addi, "Army divided over Algeria's future," Le Monde diplomatique in English, March 1999.

(3) See Le Monde diplomatique, March 1995.